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Abstract. We present the main concepts, components, and usage of
Gasol, a Gas AnalysiS and Optimization tooL for Ethereum smart con-
tracts. Gasol offers a wide variety of cost models that allow inferring
the gas consumption associated to selected types of EVM instructions
and/or inferring the number of times that such types of bytecode in-
structions are executed. Among others, we have cost models to measure
only storage opcodes, to measure a selected family of gas-consumption
opcodes following the Ethereum’s classification, to estimate the cost of
a selected program line, etc. After choosing the desired cost model and
the function of interest, Gasol returns to the user an upper bound of
the cost for this function. As the gas consumption is often dominated
by the instructions that access the storage, Gasol uses the gas analysis
to detect under-optimized storage patterns, and includes an (optional)
automatic optimization of the selected function. Our tool can be used
within an Eclipse plugin for Solidity which displays the gas and instruc-
tions bounds and, when applicable, the gas-optimized Solidity function.
1 Introduction and Main Applications
Ethereum [26] is a global, open-source platform for decentralized applications
that has become the world’s leading programmable blockchain. As other block-
chains, Ethereum has a native cryptocurrency named Ether. Unlike other block-
chains, Ethereum is programmable using a Turing complete language, i.e., de-
velopers can code smart contracts that control digital value, run exactly as pro-
grammed, and are immutable. A smart contract is basically a collection of code
(its functions) and data (its state) that resides at a specific address on the
Ethereum blockchain. Smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain are metered
using gas. Gas is a unit that measures the amount of computational effort that
it will take to execute each operation. Every single operation in Ethereum, be it
a transaction or a smart contract instruction execution, requires some amount of
gas. The gas consumption of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) instructions
is spelled out in [26]; importantly, instructions that use replicated storage are
gas-expensive. Miners get paid an amount in Ether which is equivalent to the
total amount of gas it took them to execute a complete operation. The rationale
for gas metering is threefold: (i) Paying for gas at the moment of proposing the
transaction prevents the emitter from wasting miners computational power by
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requiring them to perform worthless intensive work. (ii) Gas fees disincentive
users to consume too much of replicated storage, which is a valuable resource
in a blockchain-based consensus system (this is why storage bytecodes are gas-
expensive). (iii) It puts a cap on the number of computations that a transaction
can execute, hence prevents DoS attacks based on non-terminating executions.
Solidity [12] is the most popular language to write Ethereum smart contracts
that are then compiled into EVM bytecode. The Solidity compiler, solc, is able
to generate only constant gas bounds. However, when the bounds are parametric
expressions that depend on the function parameters, on the contract state, or on
the blockchain state (according to the experiments in [7] this happens in almost
10% of the functions), named solc, returns∞ as gas bound. This paper presents
Gasol, a resource analysis and optimization tool that is able to infer parametric
bounds and optimize the gas consumption of Ethereum smart contracts. Gasol
takes as input a smart contract (either in EVM, disassembled EVM, or in Solidity
source code), a selection of a cost model among those available in the system (c.f.
Section 2), and a selected public function, and it automatically infers cost upper
bounds for this function. Optionally, the user can enable the gas optimization
option (c.f. Section 3) to optimize the function w.r.t. storage usage, a highly
valuable resource. Gasol has a wide range of applications: (1) It can be used to
estimate the gas fee for running transactions, as it soundly over-approximates
the gas consumption of functions. (2) It can be used to certify that the contract
is free of out-of-gas vulnerabilities, as our bounds ensure that if the gas limit
paid by the user is higher than our inferred gas bounds, the contract will not run
out-of-gas. (3) As an attacker, one might estimate, how much Ether (in gas), an
adversary has to pour into a contract in order to execute an out-of-gas attack.
Also, attacks were produced by introducing a very large number of underpriced
bytecode instructions [22]. Our cost models could allow detecting these second
type of attacks by measuring how many instructions will be executed (that
should be very large) while its associated gas consumption remains very low. (4)
As we will show in the paper, the gas analysis can be used to detect gas-expensive
fragments of code and automatically optimize them.
2 Gas Analysis using Gasol
Figure 1 overviews the components of the Gasol tool. The programmer can
use Gasol during the software development process from its Eclipse plugin
that allows selecting the cost model of interest and the function to be analyzed
and/or optimized from the Outline. This selection together with the compiled
EVM code is sent to the gas analyzer. A technical description of all phases
that comprise a gas analysis for EVM smart contracts is given in [7]. Basically,
the analyzer uses various tools [3,6] to extract the CFGs and decompile them
into a high-level representation from which upper bounds (UB) are produced by
using extensions of resource analyzers and solvers [4,5]. However, in our basic
gas analyzer named gastap [7], there was only one cost model to compute the
overall gas consumption of the function (including the opcode and memory gas
costs [26]), while Gasol is an extension of gastap that introduces optimization,
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Fig. 1. Overview of Gasol’s components
a wide variety of analysis options to define novel cost models, and an Eclipse
plugin. The UBs are provided to the user in the console as well as in markers
for functions within the Eclipse editor. If the user had selected the optimization
option, the analyzer detects potential sources of optimization and feeds them to
the optimizer to generate an optimized Solidity function within a new file.
Fig. 2 displays our Eclipse plugin that contains a fragment of the public smart
contract ExtraBalToken [1] used as running example. We can see its six state
variables and its function fill that we will analyze and optimize. The right side
window shows Gasol’s configuration options to set up the cost model :
(i) Type of resource (gas/instructions): by selecting gas, we estimate the gas
consumption according to the gas model in [26] (hence, use Gasol as a gas ana-
lyzer); by selecting instructions, we estimate the number of bytecode instructions
executed (using Gasol as a standard complexity analyzer).
(ii) Type of instructions: allows selecting which instructions (or group of instruc-
tions) will be measured as follows.
– All : every bytecode instruction will be measured. For instance, by selecting
gas in (i), the function fill, and this option, we obtain as gas bound: 1077 +
40896 · data. Besides, by using this option, Gasol also yields the so-called
memory gas (see[26]): 3 · (data + 5) +
⌊
(data+5)2
512
⌋
. The analyzer abstracts
arrays by their length, hence, these bounds are functions of the length of the
input array (denoted as data) and can be used, e.g., to determine precisely
how much gas is necessary to run a transaction that executes this function.
– Gas-family : [26] classifies bytecode instructions according to their gas con-
sumed in six groups: zero, base, verylow, low, mid and high. Instructions that
do not belong to any of the previous groups are considered as single fam-
ilies. This option provides the cost due to each gas-family separately and,
by using the filter in (iii), we can type the name of the desired group(s).
As an example, for the function fill using gas in (i), we obtain gas bounds
297 + 315 · data and 16 + 8 · data for the gas-families verylow and mid, resp.
– Storage: only the instructions that access the storage (namely bytecodes
SLOAD and SSTORE) are accounted. The gas bounds displayed within the
Eclipse console in Fig. 2 correspond to this setting, where we can see that
the gas due to the access of each basic storage variable is shown separately.
The first row unknown accumulates the gas of all accesses to non-basic types
(data structures) as we still cannot identify them. By comparing this storage
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Fig. 2. Excerpt of smart contract ExtraBalToken in Solidity within Eclipse plugin.
View of analyze+configure menu for selection of cost model and optimization flag.
gas with the overall gas bound shown above for All, we can observe that most
of the gas consumed by the function is indeed dominated by the storage
(namely 40.000 out of 40.896 at each loop iteration) and it is thus a target
for optimization, as we will see in Sec. 3.
– Storage-optimization: it bounds the number of SLOAD and SSTORE instruc-
tions executed by the current function (excluding those in transitive calls).
It is the cost model that is used to detect and carry out the optimization
described in Sec. 3. Thus, it is the only selection that enables the Gas opti-
mization that appears as third option, and forces the selection of “instruc-
tions” as type of resource in (i). We obtain for the state variable totalSuply
the bound: 2 · data, which captures that we execute two accesses (one read,
one write) to field totalSuply at each loop iteration.
– Line: this option allows specifying the line number (of the Solidity pro-
gram) whose cost will be measured, and the remaining lines will be filtered
out. For instance, if the line number specified in the filter (iii) is 17, i.e., the
Solidity instruction: uint amount = data[i ] / D160, the obtained gas bound is
3 + 97 · data. In the absence of number in the filter, the bounds are given
separately for all program lines. This option is intended to help the program-
mer in improving the gas consumption of her code by trying out different
implementation options and comparing the results.
– Selected : allows computing the consumption associated to each different
EVM instruction separately. For instance, if we select the bytecode instruc-
tions MLOAD and SHA3, we obtain the gas bounds 6+15·data and 84·data resp.
As in the previous option, the filter allows the user to select the bytecode
instructions of interest and filter out the remaining.
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(iii) Filter : this is a text field used to filter out information from the UBs. For
gas-family, the user can specify low, mid, etc. For storage, it allows specifying the
name of the basic field(s) whose storage will be measured. For line and selected,
we can type the line numbers and names of bytecode instructions of interest.
Once all options have been selected, we have set up a cost model that is sent
together with the EVM code to the gas analyzer and, after analysis, it outputs
an UB for the selected function w.r.t. the cost model activated by the options.
This UB is displayed, as shown in Fig. 2 in the console of the Eclipse plugin,
and also within markers next to the function definition.
3 Gas Optimization using Gasol
The information yield by the gas analysis is used in Gasol to detect potential
optimizations. Currently, the optimization target is the reduction of the gas con-
sumption associated to the usage of storage. In particular, we aim at replacing
multiple accesses to the same (global) storage data within a fragment of code
(each write access costs 20.000 in the worst case and 5.000 in the best case) by
one access that copies the data in storage to a (local) memory position followed
by accesses to such memory position (an access to the local memory costs only
3) and a final update to the storage if needed. The cost model number of in-
structions for storage-optimization described in Sec. 2 allows us to detect such
storage optimizations, namely for each different field, if we get a bound that is
different from one, we know that there may be multiple accesses to the same po-
sition in the storage and we try to replace them by gas-efficient memory accesses.
Our transformation is done at the level of the Solidity code, by defining a local
variable with the same name as the state variable to transform, and introduc-
ing setter and getter functions to access the storage variable. Currently, we can
transform accesses to variables of basic types, in the future, we plan to extend
it to data structures (maps and arrays). The number of instructions bound for
field totalSupply is 2 · data (hence 6= 1), and our optimization of fill is:
1 function fill (uint [] data) {
2 uint256 totalSupply = get field totalSupply () ;
3
4 if ((msg.sender != owner)||(sealed))
5 throw;
6 for (uint i=0; i<data.length; i++) {
7 address a = address( data[ i ] & (D160−1) );
8 uint amount = data[i] / D160;
9 if (balanceOf[a] == 0) {
10 balanceOf[a] = amount;
11 totalSupply += amount;
12 }
13 }
14 set field totalSupply ( totalSupply ) ;
15 }
The gas bound (using the option All) for the optimized fill yield by Gasol is
21368 + 20674 ·data, which means that, assuming the worst case for write access
to storage, the gas consumed inside the loop is 49.45% smaller than the one for
the original fill function (the memory gas does not change). Note that, even if
we consider the best case of 5.000 for write access to storage for the accesses we
have optimized, the gas reduction is still around 20%. This is, in fact, what we
have manually estimated using the actual data of the 82 times this function has
been executed in the Ethereum blockchain, achieving with Gasol a total saving
of almost 60M gas. As our transformation is local to the function, in order to
be sound, we check that the transformed global data is not being accessed by
transitive calls. For instance, if there was a call to another function from function
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fill that accesses totalSupply, we would not transform it. Besides, for efficiency,
we check if all accesses are read (bytecode SLOAD) and, in such case, we do not
need to invoke the setter at the end (and avoid an unnecessary write access).
4 Related Tools and Conclusions
Numerous tools are being developed to catch different types of vulnerabilities of
smart contracts [19,15,21,18,16,25,17,9,14,8]. As mentioned in Sec. 1, the Solidity
compiler solc is not able to give any gas estimation for the running example, as
its gas consumption is not constant. Therefore, new gas analysis tools are being
developed to detect potential gas related vulnerabilities and to infer bounds in
these complex situations. The purpose of the Gasper and MadMax tools is
precisely the detection of gas related vulnerabilities. MadMax [13] focuses on
identifying control- and data-flow patterns inherent for the gas-related vulnera-
bilities, thus, it works as a bug-finder, rather than as a gas analyzer like Gasol.
Similarly, Gasper identifies gas-costly programming patterns [11] by matching
specific control-flow patterns and using SMT solvers and symbolic computation.
Thus, it is an optimization detector, not an automatic optimizer as Gasol. The
recently developed ebso tool [23] also aims at optimizing the gas consumption
of EVM code. In contrast to Gasol, ebso’s optimizations are limited to a basic
block level, while our transformation might involve several blocks of the CFG
and would not be achievable by ebso’s approach. Also, ebso is not guided by
the results of an automatic resource analysis which can capture the expensive
storage patterns as in our case. Instead it is based on a full exploration of all
possible alternative instructions (within the considered block) that would lead to
the same result and consume less gas. They have obtained a number of rewrite
rules that define sequences of bytecode instructions that can be replaced by
equivalent ones that consume less. We could easily incorporate such basic block
replacement optimizations within our tool, and it is part of our agenda.
The approach of [20], like ours, aims at inferring precise gas bounds. Their
approach is based on symbolically enumerating all execution paths [10] and
unwinding loops to a limit. Instead, using resource analysis, Gasol infers the
maximal number of iterations for loops and generates accurate gas bounds which
are valid for any possible execution of the function and not only for the unwound
paths. The approach by Marescotti et al. has not been implemented in the con-
text of EVM and a tool like Gasol has not been delivered. An orthogonal line of
work with ours is the construction of resource-oriented attacks [22] that exploit
the weaknesses of the EVM gas model. Gasol’s cost models could help detect
this resource-oriented attacks by estimating the number of executed bytecode
instructions (very high) and their associated gas consumption (very low).
Finally, there is a tendency to define new languages (see Scilla [24], Michelson
[2]) for programming smart contracts that provide certain safety guarantees, e.g.,
Scilla [24] provides predictable gas consumption by disallowing general recursion
and while-loops. However, Ethereum is today the most widely used blockchain,
and Solidity the most popular programming language to write Ethereum smart
contracts, for which a gas analyzer+optimizer is of clear relevance.
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